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Abstract 
Yeap (1988) argued that an important basis for computing a cognitive map is the ability to compute 
and recognise local environments. Although e has demonstrated how such local environments could 
be used to construct a raw cognitive map, he failed to produce an adequate algorithm for computing 
them. In this paper, a detailed study of this problem is presented. We argue that although each 
local environment computed forms a natural basis for constructing a raw cognitive map, it is not 
computed primarily to do so. Instead, it is computed for one's immediate needs (such as hunting 
a prey or escaping from danger). This change in perspective argues for a very different cognitive 
mapping process, namely one that computes local environments a the individual moves through 
the environment but these representations are not necessarily used to construct a raw map. The 
individual does not do so until there is evidence that it is going to stay. Consequently this simplifies 
the algorithm for computing a local environment and a new algorithm is thus proposed. Some results 
of our implementation are shown. © 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. 
Keywords: Local space; Cognitive map; Qualitative spatial reasoning 
1. Introduction 
Urban planners, geographers and environmental  psychologists have long been interested 
in the human's  perception of the environment (e.g., [10,30]) and AI researchers have in the 
past attempted to develop computational models of the underlying processes (e.g., [9,25, 
42]). Yeap [42] strongly argued that it is important o know what should be computed 
in a cognitive map based initially on information derived from one's sensory perception 
of the environment. Such a map is termed a raw cognitive map. He further argued that 
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the first step is to compute a representation f each local environment visited. These 
local environments are then connected, in the way which they have been experienced, to
form the raw map. However, defining what constitutes a local environment and especially 
its boundary is a problem. This is particularly the case when one has to explore the 
environment in a piecemeal fashion and with very noisy input. When does one local 
environment end and another begin? How does one recognise previously computed local 
environments when they are traversed on different routes? 
We refer to the representation computed for each local environment as an Absolute 
Space Representation (ASR). Our earlier implementations of an ASR focused on the 
use of surfaces which are large enough to prevent one from moving out of the current 
local environment (e.g., see [44]). These surfaces act as natural barriers and by selecting 
the appropriate ones, the current local environment is identified. Technically, the general 
problem is to find suitable connections between surfaces to form a boundary surrounding 
the viewer. Fig. 1 shows an example of an automaton with a 360-degree view of its 
environment producing a room-like ASR. However, in general, the perceived surfaces 
could be connected in any arbitrary manner to form a boundary enclosing the viewer. Are 
there any useful criteria (say, similar to those for computing the shape of objects [32]) for 
judging the suitability of the shape computed? We believe not. This is because it is not the 
shape of the ASR per se that is important but rather it is the perception of the empty space 
which lies ahead of the viewer. This space invariably changes, depending on the vantage 
point and the clarity of view, and it is not something for which one has to compute a fixed 
canonical shape as is the case for object recognition. 
We are interested in designing acognitive algorithm for computing local environments. 
We begin by making two observations, both of which support he argument that the 
immediate task is to compute the local environment for the activities that will take place 
within it rather than for building a raw map. This is in contrast to many earlier studies of 
the cognitive mapping process including those of our own and as we shall soon see, has 
helped us to bridge the gap between cognitive mapping and vision. The two observations 
are: 
(i) Humans cannot compute a cognitive map from a single experience of the 
environment. This might be explained conveniently by pointing out that humans 
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Fig. I. Computing the boundary of an ASR--on the left is the robot, R, with a 360-degree view and on the right 
is the ASR computed. Note that surfaces e andj are perceived to be inside the ASR while surface h is perceived 
as outside the ASR. The grey lines are virtual boundary surfaces. 
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simply cannot remember all the information perceived. However, we argue that such 
forgetfulness implies that what is computed must already be useful to the individual 
in more important ways than simply as being a building block for computing the 
raw map. If this was not so then to compute and to simply forget would be an 
unnecessary waste of one's effort. 
(ii) Anthropologists ell us that humans were wanderers and hunters before they became 
settlers. Once the wanderer had moved on to new places there was no need to return 
to familiar places and hence no need to construct a raw map. Thus the need for 
such a map came much later in the evolutionary process. However, they would have 
needed a representation for each local environment atthe time they were visited so 
that they knew where their kin were located and where their prey (enemy) was and 
how they could get to (away from) it. 
The first observation prompts us to ask why exactly do we want to compute adescription 
of each local space and the second suggests an important reason for doing so. For that 
purpose, we argue that the important pieces of infbrmation which need to be made explicit 
are the extent of the local environment and its exits. Such information must be easily 
computed from the input since humans eem to move from one place to another effortlessly, 
giving us the impression that the required information is available almost immediately. 
Vision research tells us that human vision has many ways of computing depth, from 
which we expect the extent of a local environment, once defined, could be computed. 
We will show, using simulated 2D environments, how exits are identified from the input 
and once they are identified, how the computation of the boundary of local environments 
naturally follows. It is important o point out that our implementation, although tested 
using simulated 2D environments, does not use any information ot easily available in the 
real world. Although this is the case, our primary concern here is to understand why these 
computations evolved as they did rather than with the design of a suitable implementation 
in the real world. Following the successful computation of ASRs in our simulation, two 
other problems were investigated, namely the problem of recognising ASRs re-visited and 
the problem of remembering ASRs as part of a raw cognitive map. In the former, we show 
how Yeap's [42] memory for one's immediate surroundings (MFIS) can be constructed as 
a global map of ASRs always centered on the current ASR. In the latter, we show how a 
raw map of "fuzzy" ASRs is constructed and used to study how a human could learn a 
cognitive map. A synopsis of the paper now follows. 
The theory underpinning our approach can be found in Yeap's [42] computational theory 
of cognitive mapping and which we briefly review in Section 2. In Section 3, we discuss 
ASR computations and show the various results from our simulation studies. Section 3.1 
presents our new algorithm for computing an ASR, emphasising the importance of making 
explicit exit information in addition to surfaces in view. A straightforward definition for an 
exit is used which is based on the observation that a gap is present when one (reasonably 
large) surface occludes another. Thus, an exit is the shortest edge covering the occluded 
edge. By covering, it is meant that the viewer must cross the exit in order to reach the 
occluded edge. In the implementation, we show how such exits are computed and how they 
are used to compute ASRs. Briefly, to compute xits we need to identify where occlusions 
occur, i.e., we need to (i) identify large surfaces in view (those which can obstruct one's 
motion), and (ii) which of the surfaces in view are in front of their neighbouring surfaces. 
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Having identified exits, we discuss, in Section 3.2, the problems of computing the initial 
shape of the ASR and how it will be extended later as the local environment is being 
explored. Both problems turn out to be solved easily. The former equires that one eliminate 
surfaces which can be seen through an exit since they are outside the ASR. The latter is 
solved by realising that there are two kinds of exits, a doubtless exit (with no occluded 
vertices) and a doubtful exit (with one occluded vertex), and that one needs to extend only 
from a doubtful exit. 
Section 3.3 discusses the problem of recognising ASRs re-visited and Section 3.4 
briefly touches on the problem of computing ASRs in an "open" environment. For the 
recognition problem, we continue to develop Yeap's [42] idea of using a memory for one's 
immediate surroundings (MFIS) as a crude means of recognising ASRs which one has just 
visited. This structure contains the ASR currently occupied by the viewer and the most 
recently visited ASRs which are closeby. The spatial ayout of these ASRs is remembered 
.'N 
Fig. 2. The environment used to test our algorithms. The environment is obtained from [34] and reprinted with 
permission. The "eye", currently ooking at the shaded region, represents a imulated robot/person. 
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Fig. 3. The ASRs computed asthe path in Fig. 2 was traversed. Note that he ASRs are laid out in a global 
coordinate system for display purposes. Inreality each ASR has its own local coordinate system and is connected 
to adjacent ASRs only via traversed xits. The shape of each ASR stored in the raw map would be simplified 
since its exact shape is not recorded, 
collectively in a global coordinate system. Knowing the location of these ASRs in a global 
sense one can easily determine when one of them is revisited. 
Humans do not remember much of their early experiences with a novel environment. 
Thus, what should be stored in the raw map, at least initially, are "fuzzy" ASRs. Section 3.5 
shows how fuzzy ASRs could be created and the behaviour which could be obtained using 
a raw map of fuzzy ASRs. With hindsight, we note that if what is created in the raw map 
is a network of fuzzy ASRs, then the map initially would be very confusing unless some 
recognition of ASRs, as they are re-visited, is possible. This is especially true of those just 
visited in one's immediate surroundings. With no recognition, every time one moved from 
one ASR to another and back again, three fuzzy ASRs would result in one's cognitive map 
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instead of two, i.e., there would be two ASRs computed for the initial local space. Using 
the MFIS to recognise recently visited ASRs it is possible to avoid the storage of duplicate 
ASRs for the same physical spaces at least within the immediate surroundings. The MFIS 
can thus be seen as a structure which enables a more orderly perception of our immediate 
surroundings. 
Fig. 2 shows one of the simulated environments being used to test our algorithm. In 
this example, the robot executed 1697 commands to move through the environment while 
maintaining an MFIS. The robot computed 124 different ASRs. Fig. 3 shows the ASRs 
computed. 
In the concluding section, Section 4, the theory is re-visited to discuss its significance 
with respect o other work. In particular, Section 4.1 discusses how landmark theories of 
cognitive mapping could be combined with our approach. We conclude with a technical 
definition of what it means to form a landmark, namely the marking or enhancement of 
information in the raw map by the object recognition process. In Section 4.2 we discus 
Chown et al.'s [6] model of cognitive mapping which appeared in the literature recently. 
Their model is similar to ours in that what is proposed is also based on the idea of 
computing local environments visited. Section 4.3 provides a summary of our work and 
raises some of the immediate questions that we have not answered in the body of the 
paper. 
2. Yeap's computational theory of cognitive maps 
In Marr's [31, p. 3] words, vision is the "process of discovering from images what is 
present in the world, and where it is". However, vision cannot tell you what is behind 
you or what to expect when you turn the corner. Computing a larger picture of what 
is out there is the task of cognitive mapping. For vision, the problem is to recover the 
information from what is basically a 2D image but for cognitive mapping, the problem is 
not simply recording what is out there and extending itas more is perceived. This is because 
humans can rarely remember everything perceived from the start to the end of a journey. 
The cognitive map must be developed over time. The question is what is remembered 
first and how is that information to be useful later? Finding an answer to this question is 
compounded by the fact that the process receives input from all the different senses, is 
influenced by what one knows, and is intemlpted by all the other activities that took place 
during the journey. Cognitive mapping is thus a complex process which involves both one's 
perception and conception of the outside world. Like vision, it should be studied as an 
information-processing task and as Marr [31, p. 27] has argued, the first and most critical 
step is to identify a computational theory which explains what is to be computed and why 
it should be computed. Yeap proposed one such theory and an overview is presented below. 
When designing a computational theory, the first step is to clearly identify the input 
to the process. Yeap observed that although a cognitive map is the result of integrating 
information from all the different senses, there is usually a primary sense whose 
information provides the basis for building a cognitive map. For humans, this is vision. 
If so, the immediate question is: what is the appropriate input from vision and what is to be 
computed next? The (initial) map to be computed is about he spatial layout of things in the 
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environment but identifying where things are is independent of knowing what the things 
are. This is true provided one can somehow sense the spatial ayout of the different things 
in the environment and this is exactly what is provided in what Marr called the 2 1/2D 
Sketch. The 2 I/2D sketch is a description of the surfaces and their spatial ayout within 
one's current field of view. In other words, Marr's Primal Sketch is ruled out because one 
could not identify from it what and where things are and the 3D sketch is ruled out because 
it is, although useful, not essential. 
The problem can now be formulated more precisely: how could one compute a cognitive 
map based on successive views about he environment, each of which describes the surfaces 
and their (relative) distances from the viewer. At this level, it is still important to consider 
what it is possible to compute rather than what is desirable at a higher level. As such, where 
vision ends with the 2 1/2D Sketch, Yeap argued that the cognitive mapping process hould 
begin with computing a raw cognitive map. The latter epresentation is a representation f 
the physical world as perceived by our senses; by "raw", it is meant hat the representation 
is computed with minimal use of one's conceptual knowledge of what is out there. A later 
cognitive mapping process will take the raw map as input and produce a conceptual 
representation f the world. This representation is known as a ful l  cognitive map; the word 
fu l l  indicates the full richness of the map as a cognitive representation. 
What is computed in the raw map is critically" dependent on the information available 
from the 2 1/2D sketch. The information in the 2 1/2D sketch can be described as both 
unstable and incomplete. It is unstable because it depends critically on the vantage point. 
It is incomplete because it does not tell us what is behind us and much of what is in front 
could be hidden due to occlusion. This provides the goal for the first stage of the cognitive 
mapping process--to transform and group each viewer-centered description of a part of 
the local environment into a complete and stable description of each local environment. 
A computational theory of early cognitive mapping must now explain what is computed 
as a complete and stable description of a local environment. In other words, what kind of 
representation is computed as a raw map? What kind of information eeds to be made 
explicit in it so that it will be useful for later processing? Recall that what is made 
explicit in the 2 1/2D sketch is information about he surfaces and their relative distances 
from the viewer. From this, one could compute in the raw map a description of how the 
surfaces in view are arranged using a nonegocentric reference frame. However, not any 
nonegocentric spatial description of the surfaces in view would be useful. For example, 
one which captures all the surfaces in view would not be useful since this contains too 
much information for our purpose. What is needed is a spatial description which tells us 
the (rough) shape and extent of the current local environment encompassing the individual. 
Such a representation emphasises the local environment's spatiality (or its empty space) 
rather than its content. 
Yeap suggested that the boundary for each local environment should be computed only 
from surfaces which are perceived as obstacles to the viewer's movements, thus ignoring 
the smaller objects in view. The gaps between these obstacles naturally become the exits. 
A description of each local environment thus computed represents a unique local space in 
one's memory. The space exists on its own. It is absolute. It has its own coordinate system. 
Other things could be described in it and events that happened there could be remembered. 
Yeap referred to such a description as an Absolute Space Representation (ASR). The raw 
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map then is a network of ASRs. A link between two ASRs in the network is created as 
the result of the direct experience of moving between the two ASRs. When the viewer 
leaves the current ASR, a new ASR is to be computed immediately, In this way, the viewer 
feels bounded in the local environment. That this is important is demonstrated in some 
experiments on how rats and children perceive their environments [3,5,12,21,22]. 
Such a raw map has several advantages too. Its parts are computed locally and their 
relations describe the way in which an individual experiences the world rather than the way 
in which the world is structured. That a human's cognitive map is very much dependent on 
how the environment is experienced is clearly demonstrated in an interesting experiment 
by Wood and Beck [41]. In it, they showed how the tourists' remembered two physically 
adjacent structures as being far apart because these structures are experienced as the last 
building in two different journeys tarting from the same place but moving in opposite 
directions. Such a map is not sensitive to every change in the environment and hence it is 
stable, reflecting the (relatively) unchanging world in which we live. It can be developed 
incrementally since it is neither necessary to have a complete description of each ASR 
nor the relations between individual ASRs in the map before one can use the information 
sensibly. This complies with the principle of graceful degradation. Since the environment 
is partitioned in a modular fashion, it allows the individuals to compute the different parts 
of the environment independently. 
Except for its network structure, the raw map contains much information that has not 
yet been organised. The full cognitive map is proposed as a collection of representations 
which grows out of the raw map, each of which imposes a particular way of looking at 
(some of) the information i  the raw map. One important notion is the concept of a "place" 
and in particular, the concept of "activity-places" [38]. Many experiments (e.g., [4,19]) 
have demonstrated the hierarchical nature of a place representation. Using the ASRs, one 
could form a hierarchy of places by grouping one or more ASRs as a place, one or more 
places as a higher-order place, and so on. However, our concern in this paper is with how 
the raw map is computed and not with the full map. We will therefore not discuss the full 
map further. 
The key to a successful implementation f the raw map lies in knowing how an ASR 
is computed from successive views of the whole environment. A suitable algorithm is 
presented next. 
3. ASR computations---a cognitive approach 
We have developed a new algorithm for computing an ASR which is centred on the 
idea that identification of exits is the cornerstone tocomputing a description of the local 
space. We show how exits are defined and how the initial shape, obtained from a single 
150-degree view, is extended as more of the local environment is perceived. We tested 
our algorithm using two simulated 2D environments and various results are presented. 
We further investigated how the ASRs computed could be used in the cognitive mapping 
process to form a raw map. Two problems were studied, namely recognising ASRs re- 
visited in one's immediate surroundings and remembering ASRs as fuzzy ASRs in a raw 
map. 
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3.1. Computing the boundary of the ASR 
Exits are identified as follows. Whenever one surface is viewed as occluded by another 
surface, agap exists which we label as an occluded edge (for example, see edges BC, FG, 
and IJ in Fig. 4). The occluded edge and the exit, are thus virtual surfaces. For simplicity, 
the surfaces of individual objects, i.e., surfaces below the viewer's line of sight inside the 
local environment, are ignored. An exit is the shortest edge covering the occluded edge. 
By covering, it is meant hat the viewer must cross the exit in order to reach the occluded 
edge. For example in Fig. 4, the exit JF is said to cover the occluded edge FG (and IJ). 
Computing this is straightforward. Firstly the surfaces in the current view are divided about 
the occluded edge FG so that F is in group I (FD, DC, BA) and G in group II (K J, IG). 
Then the exit is found by taking the occluding vertex F and connecting it to the nearest 
point (to F) on a surface in the group opposite to it, i.e., group II. Candidate points are H 
and J, but J is the closest point to F so the exit is JF. Coincidentally, both points J and F 
are occluding. However, only the point at which the exit is calculated, point F in this case, 
must be an occluding vertex. If point F had been closer to H than J, H would have been 
preferred and it is not an occluding vertex. The points to consider when calculating the exit 
at point B are C, E, G, and J and the exit becomes BC. 
Once the exits are computed, the boundary is obtained by removing exits and surfaces 
which are perceived as outside the current ASR, a process dubbed "trimming" (see Fig. 5). 
In Fig. 5(a) it is obvious that surfaces 3, s4 and s5 are outside the ASR boundary and 
should be removed but it is less clear which surfaces hould be removed in Fig. 5(b). One 
solution would be that the ASR boundary comprise surfaces l, s2, s6, s7 and exit e3 with 
surfaces 4, s5, s3 and exit e2 being removed, ff this ASR boundary were chosen then 
surfaces 4 and s5 would be contained within the boundary rather than being part of it. 
An alternative solution would be for the ASR boundary to comprise surfaces l, s2, s4, 
s5, s6, s7 and exit e2 with surface s3 and exit e3 being removed. It was noted that part 
of exit e3 appears in an unexplored portion of the environment and this part could well 
be a solid wall rather than an open space. An important consideration i deciding which 
is the more suitable boundary is what the ASR actually means to the viewer. As has been 
argued earlier, its overriding purpose is to indicate the extent of the open space which 
surrounds the viewer. Surfaces 4 and s5 indicate the limit of open space in one direction 
and should thus be part of the boundary. Exits which are not completely in view such as e3 
H t -1  
Viewer 
Fig. 4. A view of the environment (in2D). 
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Fig. 5. Trimming the ASR. In (a) and (b) two situations are shown where "trimming" is needed. The surfaces and 
exits in the shaded area re trimmed from the ASK Note that exit el is not shown; it is the exit used to enter the 
ASR and is added at the end. 
in Fig. 5(b) should not be considered as part of the boundary. The algorithm ensures this 
by not allowing "phantom" exits (i.e., those with one vertex not directly perceived to touch 
a surface) to be created and this greatly simplifies the trimming algorithm. Since the list of 
surfaces for forming the ASR boundary is ordered as they appear, from the left periphery to 
the right periphery in each view, the trimming process merely involves removing surfaces 
and exits which come between the two surfaces directly beside the exit. The former must 
be perceived as behind the latter and thus should be removed. 
The basic steps of the computation are as follows: Given a list of surfaces in the current 
view ordered from the left to the right, exits are computed. Each exit (a virtual boundary 
descriptor) is then inserted into the list of surfaces in view so that the surface to the left of 
it is always the surface connected to the exit's left vertex. Trimming begins by scanning 
surfaces to the right of the exit. Surfaces on the right of the exit are removed until one is 
found which is connected to the exit's right vertex. In the example in Fig. 5(a) the surfaces 
depicted together with exits would be listed as (sl s2 e2 s3 e3 s4 s5 s6 s7). When trimming, 
e2 is first encountered and the algorithm will look for s6 as its right adjacent surface. In its 
search, it will remove s3 through to s5. The result is the ASR boundary. The algorithm for 
computing the boundary is given below: 
CALC-ASR 
Input: The list of surfaces in the current view. Surfaces are ordered as they appear in the 
current view from the leftmost periphery to the rightmost periphery. Label this 
list POTENTIAL-ASR. The exit used to enter the ASR, label this El.  
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(1) With 
exit: 
(1.1) 
(1.2) 
(1.3) 
(1.4) 
(1.5) 
(1.6) 
each occluding vertex remaining on POTENTIAL-ASR calculate an 
Label this occluding vertex, EXIT-vertexl. 
The surface containing EXlT-vertexl lies adjacent o the surface it 
occludes in the list POTENTIAL-ASR. Split the list of surfaces in 
POTENTIAL-ASR into two lists at the surface containing EXIT- 
vertexl so that EXIT-vertexl is in one list and the vertex it occludes 
in the other. Call the list of surfaces containing EXIT-vertexl and the 
surfaces extending to the periphery, SET1. Call the list of surfaces 
containing the occluded vertex and the surfaces extending to the 
opposite periphery SET2. 
Find the closest point to EXIT-vertexl from the list of surfaces in 
SET2. Label this point EXIT-vertex2. 
Insert the exit comprising EXIT-vertexl and EXIT-vertex2 in the 
ordered list POTENTIAL-ASR so that it is adjacent o the surface 
contributing its left vertex. 
Label the exit as doubtful if EXIT-vertex2 is the occluded vertex else 
label it as doubtless.;;required by EXTEND-ASR (see below). 
Trim surfaces outside the exit. 
While the surface on the right of the exit in the list POTEN- 
TIAL-ASR does not have a vertex in common with the exit do 
Remove the surface from the list POTENTIAL-ASR. 
(2) Complete the closure surrounding the viewer. Add exit E1 to POTENTIAL- 
ASR. If E1 does not connect directly to the end surfaces in POTENTIAL- 
ASR insert side exits to account for the peripheries of the view. Label these 
exits as doubtful. 
(3) Return POTENTIAL-ASR as the ASR boundary. 
The steps from the algorithm above are followed for the local environment as shown in 
Fig. 6(a) to obtain: 
Steps 
Input: POTENTIAL-ASR: (sl s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9); El. 
(1.1) 
(1.2) 
(1.3) 
(1.4) 
(1.5) 
(1.6) 
(1.1) 
(1.2) 
EXIT-vertexl: sl-vertex2. 
SETI: (sl) & SET2:(s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9). 
EXIT-vertex2: s3-vertex 1.
POTENTIAL-ASR: (sl (exit-e2 sl-vertex2 s3-vertex 1) s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 
s9). 
POTENTIAL-ASR: (sl (exit-e2 sl-vertex2 s3-vertexl doubtless) s3 s4 s5 
s6 s7 s8 s9). 
POTENTIAL-ASR: (sl (exit-e2 s2 s6 doubtless) s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9). 
EXIT-vertex 1: s4-vertex2. 
SETI: (sl s3 s4) & SET2:(s5 s6 s7 s8 s9). 
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Fig. 6. The construction ofan ASR. 
(1.3) EXIT-vertex2: s8-vertex 1. 
(1.4) POTENTIAL-ASR: (sl (exit-e2 sl-vertex2 s3-vertexl doubtless) s3 s4 
(exit-e3 s4-vertex2 s8-vertexl)s5 s6 s7 s8 s9). 
(1.5) POTENTIAL-ASR sl (exit-e2 sl-vertex2 s3-vertexl doubtless) s3 s4 (exit- 
e3 s4-vertex2 s8-vertexl doubtless) s5 s6 s7 s8 s9). 
(1.6) POTENTIAL-ASR sl (exit-e2 sl-vertex2 s3-vertexl doubtless) s3 s4 (exit- 
e3 s4-vertex2 s8-vertexl doubtless) s8 s9) removing s5, s6, and s7 in the 
last steps also removed all the occluding vertices and thus the algorithm 
moves to step (2). 
(2) POTENTIAL-ASR: (El (side-exit-e4 el-vertex2 sl-vertexl doubtful) sl (exit-e2 
sl-vertex2 s3-vertexl doubtless) s3 s4 (exit-e3 s4-vertex2 s8-vertexl doubtless) s8 
s9 (side-exit-e5 s9-vertex2 el-vertex I doubtful)). 
(3) ASR computed: (El (side-exit-e4 el-vertex2 sl-vertexl doubtful) sl (exit-e2 sl- 
vertex2 s3-vertexl doubtless) s3 s4 (exit-e3 s4-vertex2 s8-vertexl doubtless) s8 
s9 (side-exit-e5 s9-vertex2 el-vertex 1 doubtful)). The ASR as output is shown in 
Fig. 6(b). 
Crossing an exit is the signal for a new ASR to be computed. Once traversed it is out 
of sight but the viewer will still remember it as a way of exiting the current space and 
it provides an important link with the ASR just left. More importantly, until the ASR is 
computed and some other exits identified (if there are any), it is the only way the viewer 
knows how to leave the current space. Thus this exit is always included in the ASR and is 
labelled el.  The side exits (if needed) are inserted between exit el and the peripheries of 
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Fig. 7. Two simple ASRs: (left) the environment; (right) the ASRs computed. 
the current view. Figs. 7 and 8 show the ASRs computed for some of the local spaces in 
the environment depicted in Fig. 2. In Fig. 7(a) the only occlusion occurs at a periphery 
and therefore all that is required is to insert the side exits e2 and e3. In Fig. 7(b) exit e2 
covers the occluded edge between sl and s6, e3 the occluded edge between s6 and s7, and 
e4 the occluded edge between sl0 and s9. Exit e6 covers the occluded edge between s4 
and a surface not depicted. Exits e8 and e9 are side exits. 
Fig. 8(a) shows an ASR computed along a corridor. Note that if the robot, in the real 
world, could not clearly perceive the far end of the corridor, the overall shape computed 
would still remain the same as shown. Figs. 8(b) and 8(c) show the ASRs computed for 
spaces which have a more complicated arrangement of surfaces than those depicted so far. 
In Fig. 8(b) exit e5 appears alongside the surface s7. The occlusion of s8 by s7 is minimal 
and is not immediately obvious. However, it becomes o if one considers that only one 
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Fig. 8. More complicated ASRs: (left) the environment; (right) the ASRs computed. 
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side of a surface can be in view at any one time and surfaces are labelled on the side which 
is in view. Exit e5 completely "covers" the side of s7 which cannot be seen and the role 
of the exit here is merely to represent a part of the environment the viewer is unsure of. 
Thus, exits have a dual role--to indicate parts of the current space which have not been 
"uncovered" and, in the traditional sense, to indicate where one can leave the current space. 
These two roles are easily distinguished and will be discussed further in the next section 
in the context of updating the ASR. Side exits are inserted into the ASR in Fig. 8(b) to 
account for the peripheries, by connecting el to s2 on the left, forming exit e2 and to sl0 
on its right, giving exit e6. 
Note that it is the overall shape of the local environment produced that is important. For 
display purposes throughout this paper, we show the corresponding surfaces and exactly 
where each exit lies. 
3.2. Updating ASRs 
As the viewer moves around the current local space, the shape of the ASR keeps 
changing as areas that were once occluded come into view. Since exits mark areas of 
occlusion, this means that exits should be updated when the occlusions they cover are 
no longer or are less occluded. However, not all exits should be updated. It is important 
to distinguish exits which take one out of the current space and those which cover parts 
of the current space not yet discovered. If it were possible to update the former then one 
could end up with a single ASR representing the whole environment! The solution here 
is to describe the former as doubtless and the latter as doubOeul exits. A doubtless exit 
will always be the shortest possible length and it will have no occluded vertices, i.e., both 
vertices must be clearly visible; crossing such an exit is the signal that the current local 
space has been exited. By contrast, one of a doubtful exit's vertices will be occluded and 
it is this exit which is filled in when more information becomes available. In Fig. 9(a) el 
is the exit crossed to enter the ASR and is thus a doubtless exit as is e3 since both of its 
vertices are (or as in the case of el have been) fully in view. Exit e2 is doubtful because 
one of its vertices arises from the occlusion of s l by s3. Exit e4 is a side exit formed by 
connecting the unconnected vertex of el to the surface sl at the periphery. Side exits also 
cover a part of the ASR which is uncertain so they too are labelled as doubtful. 
To update a doubtful exit a simple algorithm is used: replace the previously computed 
description with the latest. An ASR is computed for the latest view. Side exits are computed 
as before to fill in the peripheries. Now if the surfaces/exits incident on each vertex of a 
doubtful exit (from the previous description) can be identified in the latest ASR description 
then the doubtful exit can be replaced with the latest description. This is possible if one 
assumes that one rarely makes a turn so large that one could not detect he overlap between 
the previous and the current view. The doubtful exit will be replaced by the surfaces and 
exits which lie between its incident surfaces in the latest ASR description. Fig. 9 shows the 
updating process as the trajectory displayed is followed. The trajectory in Fig. 9(a) starts at 
the point where the viewer arrives in the ASR and it is first computed. In Fig. 9(b), as the 
viewer turns along the trajectory, surfaces 12-s16 come into view. The ASR description 
for this view contains the exit el and surface sl which are the surface and exit incident on 
the doubtful exit, e4 in Fig. 9(a). Thus, e4 is replaced by the surfaces and exits which lie 
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Fig. 9. Updating an ASR: (left) the environment; (right) the ASR computed. The "eye" represents he viewer' 
position. 
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between el and s4 in the latest ASR description and the ASR which results is shown in 
Fig. 9(b). Note that a new side-exit, e7, is supplied with the new description. Finally, in 
Fig. 9(c) the surface s20 comes into view and this surface replaces the doubtful exit e7. 
Thus the doubtless exits prevent he ASR boundary from expanding indefinitely. Of 
course, as more of the region surrounding the occlusion becomes visible, a doubtful exit 
may be replaced by another doubtful exit and it in turn by another doubtful exit and so on. 
But eventually a doubtful exit will be replaced by a doubtless exit preventing any further 
development of the boundary at this occlusion. Fig. 10 demonstrates anoccluded region 
expanding until a doubtless exit emerges to give it its final shape. When the exit finally 
becomes doubtless it is computed just like any other exit, i.e., the algorithm requires that 
the exit be the shortest exit which will cover the occlusion. Hence, in Fig. 10(d) edl4 
intersects s4 rather than connecting atits end-point. When this happens, the vertex (of edl4) 
is fully in view and the exit has become doubtless. There is still an occlusion but it does 
not involve the exit. The occlusion is now outside the ASR. The algorithm for updating 
an ASR as described above is outlined in detail below. Because updating doubtful exits 
actually extends the ASR we call this algorithm EXTEND-ASR. 
EXTEND-ASR 
Input: The list of surfaces in current view, call this CURRENT-VIEW. The list of 
surfaces in the current ASR description, call this CURRENT-ASR. 
(1) Construct anew ASR description using current view, call this NEW-ASR. 
(2) For each doubtful exit in CURRENT-ASR do: 
(2.1) Call the surfaces which contribute vertices to the exit CONTRIBUTES 1 
and CONTRIBUTES2. 
(2.2) If CONTRIBUTES 1 and CONTRIBUTES2 occur in NEW-ASR then 
replace the exit with any surfaces which lie between them. 
(3) Return CURRENT-ASR as the updated ASR. 
3.3. Recognising ASRs--a memory for the immediate surroundings 
We have argued that the cognitive mapping process begins with computing a represen- 
tation of one's local environment which may or may not be remembered aspart of one's 
raw cognitive map. For those that are remembered, they will exist as part of a muddled, 
intertwined, sometimes confused and sometimes very accurate memory of one's experi- 
ences. How could these various fragments of one's experience be later turned into a useful 
and clear representation f one's environment? One obvious answer is to use other sources 
of information to assist he individual to remember the different ASRs computed and how 
they are related. When one experiences the environment, one does not only perceive sur- 
faces but also remembers what has happened and what and where the interesting objects 
are. 
However, one problem with the use of such information is that at present i is unclear how 
the information itself becomes available to the individual. Furthermore, individuals develop 
such knowledge and preferences based on many years of interaction i  the environment. 
Without understanding how these processes work, it would be difficult to know how such 
knowledge is brought o bear on what is computed in the raw map. In this section, we 
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Fig. 10. From a doubtful exit to a doubtless exit: (left) the environment in which the robot is moving (right) the 
ASR computed at each step. The doubtful exit is labelled edf and the doubtless exit edl. The occluded surfaces s4 
in (a), (b) and (c) is extended as more of  it comes into view but this is only possible while the exit which covers 
the occlusion is doubtful, as is edfl ,  edf2 and edf3. Once the exit becomes doubtless as is edl4 in (d), no further 
extending can occur. 
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continue our bottom-up approach to cognitive mapping and ask: Is there any direct use 
for the ASRs computed before information from other sources becomes essential to the 
cognitive mapping process? 
Yeap [42] proposed one such application, namely to create a global memory of the 
viewer's immediate surroundings, and we investigate the idea further. Based upon the 
observations of our own visual system, such as a limited view and limited range vision, 
and our visual behaviour, such as the need for active scanning [33], psychologists have 
suggested that we need to integrate the differen! views to form a more complete picture 
of what we perceive of our surroundings (e.g., [2,13]). However, the issue of how such a 
representation is computed oes not seem to have been dealt with. There are two major 
problems. The first concerns the definition of the immediate surroundings itself. When 
one moves a step, has one's immediate surroundings changed? If it has, the representation 
could be computationally very expensive to maintain. The second concerns the amount of 
information that needs to be tracked. How could one then maintain a reasonably accurate 
representation given that one's perception of the world is inherently very noisy? We discuss 
these issues below and show how a representation f one's immediate surroundings based 
upon the notion of ASRs is much easier to compute and maintain. Such a representation is 
referred to as an MHS (a Memory For one's Immediate Surroundings) and we show two 
results using the MFIS as part of a cognitive mapping process in our simulation studies. 
The first shows the viewer using the MFIS to recognise a local space revisited and the 
second demonstrates that it is not always possible to do so. 
Technically, the first problem concerns what frame of reference is appropriate for the 
MHS. One could use either an egocentric (i.e., defining spatial positions in relation to 
the self) or an allocentric (i.e., defining spatial positions external to the self) frame of 
reference. It is clear that from an implementation viewpoint, it is inefficient o use an 
egocentric reference frame. To use an allocentric reference frame, one has to specify where 
the reference frame should be centered. The choice of this external point need not be chosen 
arbitrarily if we use the current ASR as the frame of reference. An ASR has a boundary 
and any part of it would be suitable. In the implementation we choose to use the entrance 
to the current ASR as the center of the reference fi'ame. When one moves out of the current 
ASR, the MHS is shifted to center on the entrance to the next ASR. Fig. 11 shows how the 
MFIS defined as such would follow the viewer moving through the environment. 
The extent of the MFIS can be defined arbitrarily but, more importantly, need not be 
defined exactly, say, in metric terms. Varying its size is a tradeoff between how much 
information is remembered (and hence how useful the MFIS is) and how much effort is 
required to compute it. Given an MFIS with a fixed size, part of an ASR will often be 
excluded as it lies outside the area covered by the MFIS (see Fig. 11). One advantage of 
having the MFIS is to help one recognise that nearby local spaces were visited before. We, 
therefore, do not want to remove a part of an ASR (from the MFIS) because it just falls 
outside the area covered by the MFIS. Since its extent is defined arbitrarily, it is better to 
include the whole ASR if a part of it lies within the area covered by the MFIS. Fig. 12 
shows how the MFIS defined as such would grow and shrink as the viewer moves through 
the environment. 
The second problem, which concerns the vast amount of information that needs to be 
tracked, can now be solved by observing that the spatial arrangement of individual surfaces 
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Fig. 11. Defining an MFIS using the current ASR. The arrow indicates the position and orientation of the viewer 
and the shaded regions indicate the ASR the viewer has just entered. The MFIS is centred at the exit used to enter 
the current ASR, at the point marked X as shown from (a) to (d). This point is the centre of the circle in (a)-(d) 
which marks the extent of the MFIS. When the viewer moves out of the current ASR, the MFIS is shifted to 
centre on the new ASR. 
in each ASR is already maintained in the ASRs themselves. Tracking them becomes 
effortless as long as we treat the ASR as a whole when maintaining the MFIS.  
With an MFIS the viewer knows whereabouts recently visited ASRs are in relation to 
the current ASR.  When an exit in the current ASR is crossed it can be determined from the 
MFS if  this exit has taken the viewer into one of  its ASRs. The appropriate neighbouring 
ASR is retrieved instead of computing a new one. All the updating to the MFIS occurs at 
the time an ASR is entered. A lgor i thm ENTRY which takes care of  all the housekeeping 
needed when the current ASR changes is as follows: 
ENTRY 
Input: The surfaces in the current view, call this CURRENT-V IEW.  
The ASRs in the MFIS,  call this MFIS. 
The exit just crossed, call this CROSSED-EXIT .  
The ASR just departed, call this PREV-ASR.  
The raw cognit ive map, call it RCM. 
(1) Compute a new ASR from the CURRENT-V IEW and call it NEW-ASR.  
(2) Check to see if NEW-ASR has been visited before. There are two tests: one 
checks if  the exit crossed contains information on which ASR it is connected 
to and the other, i f  the exit is in the MFIS. 
I f  CROSSED-EX IT  already connects to an ASR in RCM then 
Retrieve this ASR and call it CURRENT-ASR 
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Fig. 12. Defining the extent of an MFIS whereby an ASR is either included or excluded. As is shown from (a) 
to (h), the circles mark the predefined extent of the ASR. The shaded areas indicate the extent of what is actually 
included. The difference isdue to the inclusion of the whole ASR in the MFIS when only a part of it is within the 
predefined boundary. 
Set ASR-V IS ITED True 
Else If CROSSED-EX IT  is contained in an ASR in the MFIS then 
Retrieve this ASR and call it CURRENT-ASR 
Set ASR-V IS ITED True 
Else 
Add NEW-ASR to RCM 
Call NEW-ASR CURRENT-ASR 
Set ASR-V IS ITED False. 
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(3) If CROSSED-EXIT is on the boundary of both PREV-ASR and CURRENT- 
ASR then 
Centre the coordinate system of CURRENT-ASR on 
CROSSED-EXIT. 
Else ;; CURRENT-ASR overlaps PREV-ASR. 
CROSSED-EXIT is not an exit in 
CURRENT-ASR. 
Select an exit in CURRENT-ASR and centre 
CURRENT-ASR's coordinate system on it. 
(4) If ASR-VISITED = true then 
use NEW-ASR to extend CURRENT-ASR. 
(5) If CURRENT-ASR not in MFIS then 
add CURRENT-ASR to MFIS. 
(6) Update the MFIS so that it uses the same coordinate system as CURRENT- 
ASR. 
(7) Since the centre of the MFIS has shifted remove from its content any ASRs 
which are now outside its extent. 
Thus ASR recognition is achieved in two ways: (i) when two ASRs are experienced 
in sequence it can be remembered that a particular shared exit joins the two ASRs and 
traversing this exit will take the viewer from one of these ASRs into the other, and (ii) it 
can be detected that one is re-entering a recently visited ASR stored in the MFIS. The 
success of (i) depends on a direct connection being made in the network of ASRs (the 
raw cognitive map) between two ASRS which share an exit. However, we demonstrate 
in Section 3.5 that this is not always possible. The strength of (ii) lies in its ability to 
identify two previously computed ASRs as neighbours even though they were not initially 
experienced as such. 
Note that different shaped ASRs are often computed for the same physical space when 
the space is initially viewed from a different vantage point. The result is that sometimes an 
ASR is computed which partially overlaps a recently visited ASR in the MFIS. At some 
point the viewer could be simultaneously in two (or more) ASRs. Fortunately, there is no 
need to detect hat the viewer is in one of these other ASRs until the current ASR is exited. 
The only concern at this level in the cognitive mapping process is to provide a suitable 
representation for viewer's current local space. One representation is all that is necessary 
and one need look no further than CURRENT-ASR for a suitable representation. Once 
the viewer leaves the current local space, i.e., crosses an exit in CURRENT-ASR, it then 
becomes prudent o avoid computing a new ASR for the space the viewer is entering if one 
can detect hat one has already been computed. If the boundary of this previously computed 
ASR adjoins the ASR just departed, i.e., the exit crossed is on the boundary of both ASRs, 
then the coordinate system of the newly entered ASR and the MFIS is centred on a vertex 
of this exit. However, if the ASR just entered partially overlaps the ASR just departed then 
the crossed exit may only exist on the boundary of the departed ASR and thus cannot be 
used as the centre of the newly entered ASR's coordinate system. The coordinate system 
of the ASR and the MFIS is instead centred on the exit which is closest (in distance) to the 
point where the viewer entered the ASR. 
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Fig. 13. Successful recognition of ASRs revisited when an MFIS is maintained: (top) the environment, (bottom) 
the MFIS corresponding to the steps in the environment above. The dark shaded ASR is the one the viewer 
occupies, it has exits which connect directly to the light shaded ASRs. 
We show two examples of using an MFIS in our simulations. Fig. 13(a) shows that the 
MFIS currently holds 4 ASRs. Note that in the actual implementation, all ASRs remem- 
bered are "simplified" so that what is recorded is its approximate size and shape rather 
than the exact number of surfaces. The exact display of each ASR is used here to assist he 
reader in identifying the physical space it represents. As the viewer moves to the current 
position as shown in Fig. 13(b), the MFIS continues to grow (ASRs 5, 6 and 7 are added) 
and shrink (ASR 1 removed). Fig. 13(c) shows that the viewer recognises ASR 4 when it 
moves into it from ASR 7. Fig. 14 shows an example in which the viewer fails to recognise 
an ASR revisited. In this case, ASR 4 is not recognised and a new ASR 18 is created. 
Thus once ASRs are computed, they provide us with a convenient basis to develop the 
MFIS. With the MFIS, one can perform a limited form of recognition of ASRs when they 
are revisited. This could be a useful device for helping autonomous robots to learn about 
their environments. 
3.4. An  open  env i ronment  
Defining the open space surrounding the viewer is straightforward in the closed 
environment found indoors and in cluttered outdoors environments. But how does our 
algorithm fare in open environments where the transition from one ASR to the next is less 
clear? Fig. 15 shows an outdoors environment. From a theoretical point of view one should 
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Fig. 14. Demonstrating the limited use of the MFIS for recognising ASRs revisited. The MFIS is shown as an 
inset. Observe that ASR 4 is not recognised when revisited and a new one, ASR 18, is created instead. 
be able to compute an ASR anywhere. We just need to define the extent of the open space 
surrounding the viewer, thus the boundary of the ASR could comprise "as far as the eye 
can see" in one direction or a group of trees or people in another direction. Fig. 16 shows 
the ASRs computed for a path which traverses the environment in Fig. 15. It demonstrates 
that our algorithm computes a reasonable representation for an open environment using 
simulated input. However, to be more realistic, one has to address many other issues which 
are not apparent in the simulation and these include: 
(1) The significance of naturally occurring features uch as trees, rivers and mountains. 
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Fig. 15. An "outdoor" environment. 
(2) Perspective and the blurring of things perceived further away so that when travelling 
through a large open space, some far away exits are not perceived. To what extent 
will this affect ASR computations? 
(3) The variability of views in such ASRs. Compare for example the scene at a popular 
seaside resort on a public holiday in mid-summer with the same scene in mid-winter 
or a forest before and after clear felling. 
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Fig. 16. The ASRs computed for the path in Fig. 15. 
3,5. Beyond the ASR--remembering ASRs "qualitatively" in a raw cognitive map 
Computing the local space in this way is a necessary first step but once one moves out 
of the current space, it is evidently clear that, at least for humans, one does not remember 
the exact details of its shape. Determining the ongoing nature of spatial memories when 
they are no longer receiving immediate feedback from the environment is not easy. 
Psychological studies which examine this problem are mostly concerned with the manner 
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in which the representations are distorted and their significance altered once they are 
merged into the wider "picture in the head". Variables uch as size, distance and location 
are often systematically distorted by containment relations and the significance of an object 
as compared with others it is related to [ 19,20,37,40]. However, these modifications result 
from some top-down processing, i.e., the input to the process is not only what has been 
computed bottom-up from the senses but also includes the results of earlier computations, 
often higher-level representations which are conceptually more sophisticated. 
We are interested in the more immediate problem. Given a fairly precise description of 
the current local space, should we remember the precise description as part of the raw map 
and allow information in the raw map to degrade over time as, say, a part of our process of 
forgetting? Or, should we remember an imprecise description and improve it later if and 
when we have more experience of (and hence a need to remember well) the environment? 
We opt for the latter. Degrading over time (forgetting) implies that one could, at least in the 
beginning, remember all the precise detail computed while one occupied the local space. 
This seems an unlikely scenario for a human; rather it seems more reasonable that the 
human's cognitive map of a place improves with experience. It also follows the principle 
of least effort since it is easier to remember a less detailed escription. 
We compute such a representation bydevolving the initial representation computed into 
a rectangle which roughly approximates it extent. A straightforward algorithm is used-- 
points on the surfaces forming the boundary of the ASR are sampled to firstly find a good 
length for the rectangle and then the length itself is sampled to find a good width. We call 
this representation a fuzzy ASR. Fig. 17(a) shows an initial ASR computed, its surfaces 
are labelled sl-s5 and its exits el-e4. The fuzzy ASR computed from this ASR is shown 
in Fig. 17(b). We are in the early stages of studying this problem and therefore no claims 
are made as to the cognitive plausibility of our method. In reality many processes would be 
operating to modify the original ASR and we cannot claim to fully understand these. This 
is but one method for producing a fuzzy ASR. There will be many, many more. 
The real significance of the fuzzy ASR for our computational theory is the manner in 
which the representation is able to be used to structure the cognitive map, however poorly. 
The fuzzy ASR does not comprise actual surfaces or exits, it merely represents a portion of 
space once occupied by the viewer. But one would expect he viewer to remember some of 
the connections toneighboring spaces, confused though they may be. Thus we can evaluate 
the program's performance in its ability to trace a learned path by allowing it to retain the 
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Fig. 17. (a) An exact ASR computed while the viewer occupied the local space. (b) The fuzzy ASR description 
which devolves from the ASR in (a). 
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connections toneighbouring fuzzy ASRs in different ways. We show the results of three 
tests below. For more see [23]. 
In the first test, the viewer remembers how many exits there are in an ASR but no 
locational information is retained for them. For the fuzzy ASR in Fig. 17(b), for example, 
the viewer remembers just that there are four exits, el, e2, e3 and e4. When the ASR is 
exited a connection is made to the ASR just entered but the viewer does not remember 
which exit was used. Our viewer has a very poor memory indeed! The outcome of this is 
a scenario ften faced by humans--"I know I've been here before so which doorway did 
I use to get to..." Thus the information made explicit in a fuzzy ASR comprises the rough 
extent of the ASR, the number of exits in the ASR and which neighboring ASRs have 
been experienced as connected to this one. The results of the test are displayed in Fig. 18. 
Fig. 18(a) shows the portion of the environment traversed and Fig. 18(b) a raw cognitive 
map constructed from the "exact" ASRs computed for each local space visited; note the 
global coordinate system the raw map appears to be using is for display purposes only. The 
fuzzy cognitive map constructed for the path in Fig. 18(a) would comprise: 
fuzzy-ASR1 with four exits, connected toASR 2 
fnzzy-ASR2 with two exits, connected to ASR 3, ASR 1 
fuzzy-ASR3 with five exits, connected toASR 4, ASR 2 
fuzzy-ASR4 with three exits, connected toASR 5, ASR 3 
fuzzy-ASR5 with four exits, connected toASR 6, ASR 4 
fuzzy-ASR6 with three exits, connected to ASR 5 
To demonstrate he use of a map with fuzzy ASRs, the viewer is then told to repeat 
the journey from start to finish in its head. Fig. 18(c) demonstrates how confused the 
viewer could become. As the viewer imagines re-entering ASR 1, it knows from its fuzzy 
map that one of these exits leads into ASR 2 but not which one. The viewer randomly 
chooses an exit. The line emanating from the bottom of fuzzy ASR 1, rather than its side, 
demonstrates that the viewer made an erroneous decision. It can be seen from the output 
from our computer simulations displayed in this figure that the errors made here result in 
rotation errors in the cognitive map and while they are not shown in this figure, translation 
errors are possible also. It may be worthwhile stressing that the program is imagining its 
path through the environment and therefore there is no reality check of the ASRs "visited". 
In the second test we allowed the program to remember on which side of the fuzzy ASR 
the exits were located and thus on which side of a fuzzy ASR the connection to a particular 
ASR is located. Fig. 18(d) shows the program's imagination of the path traveled. In ASR 1 
the viewer recalls that ASR 1 connects to ASR 2 via an exit on the left side of ASR 1 
and since there is only one such exit the correct choice is made. However, on the side of 
ASR 3 which connects to ASR 4 there are two exits. One leads directly into ASR 4 (see 
Fig. 18(b)) and one leads into an as yet unexplored region of the environment--this exit 
can be seen as the lighter shaded gap in the boundary directly adjacent to the exit into 
ASR 4 in Fig. 18(b). To visit ASR 4 from ASR 3 the viewer must choose between these 
exits and does so correctly (this time). If the incorrect exit had been chosen a translation 
error would have occurred. 
The third test shows the viewer actually using its fuzzy cognitive map, to find its way 
back along a previously traversed path and failing to do so. However, only very primitive 
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Fig. 18. (a) The environment traversed. (b) A cognitive map computed from exact ASRs. (c) The viewer's 
interpretation f a cognitive map computed from fuzzy ASRs where the viewer has no locational information 
for the exits. (d) The viewer's interpretation f a cognitive map constructed from fuzzy ASRs where the viewer 
knows on which side of the fuzzy ASR the exits are located but not their exact position. 
checks that the correct ASR is entered are used. The viewer firstly walked a path through 
its environment computing the fuzzy cognitive map. In Fig. 19(a) we show the accurate 
map that would be computed for the same walk so that the reader can appreciate where the 
viewer is erring. The viewer remembered only that 10 ASRs had been visited and therefore 
attempted to go back through 10 ASRs. The viewer, on reaching ASR 10, turns around and 
heads for home. With no contextual information available as a guide, and knowing only 
that one of ASR 10's exits leads into the next ASR along the path, i.e., ASR 9, the viewer 
randomly chooses an exit. It chooses correctly and enters ASR 9 in Fig. 19(b). When the 
viewer is in ASR 8 the wrong exit is chosen to enter ASR 7, but this is a dead-end and the 
viewer is forced to return to ASR 8 and then makes the correct choice. The viewer enters 
ASR 5 from a different side to that of its previous visit and a larger ASR is computed 
which incorporates both ASR 5 and ASR 4 of Fig. 19(a). Thus the viewer reaches ASR 3 
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Fig. 19. (a) A cognitive map computed from exact ASRs. Note that ASR 8 overlaps ASR 3. These two different 
ASRs for the sample physical space are computed from different vantage points. (b) The sequence of ASRs 
visited as the viewer tries to make its way home xploiting the structure ofits fuzzy cognitive map, i.e., tries to 
visit the ASRs in the reverse sequence tothat in which they were originally computed. 
of Fig. 19(a) directly from ASR 5 and thinks that it is ASR 4. ASR 2 of Fig. 19(a) is then 
entered as ASR 3. On exiting ASR 3 the viewer takes the wrong exit, choosing the one 
which will take Jt away from the "true" home ASR. Lastly, and confusingly, the viewer 
ends up back where it started, in the ASR at the end of the walk, but thinking instead that 
the "home" ASR has been reached. 
We have shown how the underlying structure of the cognitive map emerges as the 
program explores its environment, computing muddy descriptions, uncertain as to how 
they are connected. Such a map is not an unrealistic representation f a person's initial 
exploration of the environment. However a viewer using one of these maps to navigate 
around its environment would soon become lost. How is such a map enriched as the viewer 
becomes more familiar with its environment, not in precise metric terms, but merely in 
terms of being able to work out roughly where places and objects are in relation to others? 
Is this the role of landmarks? The "fuzzy cognitive map" has given us a framework in 
which we can study these problems. The fuzzy ASR provides a structure in which the 
viewer's experience of the environment can be charted. Eventually important details will be 
recorded and significant events remembered; some will be remembered well, some poorly. 
The fuzzy ASR will continue to evolve to reflect the ever changing memories one has for 
the spatial environment. 
4. Dhcus~on 
We observed that the cognitive mapping process begins by computing representations 
for one's local environments (or ASRs) without necessarily remembering them. When de- 
signing the algorithm which does this, it is thus important to find out why the representation 
is computed. In particular, what is the immediate task which the representation is designed 
to solve? 
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Fig. 20. The early cognitive mapping process. 
We have argued that the primary reason is to give the individual an immediate impression 
of the extent of its local environment and where its exits are. In the implementation, we 
showed that once exits are identified, they provide a straightforward basis for computing 
the extent of the local environment. We have also shown how the adjacent ASRs computed 
could be used to form a global map describing one's immediate surroundings. Such a 
map, which is referred to as an MFIS, is useful for recognising adjacent ASRs re-visited 
immediately. The ASRs which are finally entered into the raw map, however, are inexact 
and their interconnections may or may not be precise. Fig. 20 shows the early cognitive 
mapping process as described. 
The next two sections discuss the significance of our theory of cognitive mapping with 
respect to existing work. 
4.1. On landmark theories of cognitive mapping 
A popular theory of cognitive mapping, strongly supported by environmental psycholo- 
gists (see, for example, [ 1,7,11,14,15,17,18]), is that the initial map computed is a loosely 
connected network of landmarks. This has led to several simulation studies of cognitive 
mapping investigating how such a map changes with experience. Thus, for example, the 
TOUR model ([25], but see also [26]) showed how symbolic descriptions of places are 
assimilated, NAVIGATOR [16] studied a variety of issues related to how a cognitive map 
is learned from travelling in a simulated city, TRAVELLER [27] showed how different 
cognitive maps are generated from simulating movement through a network of nodes, and 
several recent connectionist models (e.g., NAPS [28]) of cognitive maps were given "land- 
marks" and showed how a network could be "learned". 
However, the question of what happens to one's experiences in between landmarks has 
not been resolved in these studies. A network of landmarks implies that the landmarks 
are connected in some way and one would expect hat these connections have something 
to do with what happens in between the landmarks. If not, how could a network of 
landmarks be formed without remembering how they are connected? That this question 
cannot be ignored is evident in some recent attempts to implement the landmark-based 
idea in autonomous mobile robots. For example, in Tsuji and his co-workers' [39,45,46] 
work on computing a qualitative description of the environment traversed, a network of 
landmarks i computed from a panoramic record of all the objects perceived (see Fig. 21). 
In QUALNAV [8,29], a robot is provided with a panoramic 360-degree view and from 
these views, viewframes are computed which encode landmark position. However, a new 
viewframe is computed whenever an existing landmark disappears or a new one appears or 
the ordering of existing ones changes. Both works show significant computations ateach 
view throughout the journey prior to the construction of a network of landmarks. 
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Fig. 21. (a) Panoramic views. (b) Distinct patterns from panoramic views. (c) Selected landmarks in symbolic 
description (modified with permission from Fig. 5 in 1145]). 
Given that landmarks hould be few and far between, how could they be of use in 
the cognitive mapping process? It follows from our theory of cognitive mapping that the 
importance of landmark information lies in providing the initial access to the ASRs in the 
raw map. If the initial map consists of fuzzy ASRs as we have shown it, then accessing 
any of the ASRs in it would be very difficult (except perhaps those at the start and end 
of the journey). The role of the landmark is to make some of the ASRs more accessible. 
Note that environmental psychologists have observed the wide-ranging characteristics of
landmarks in people [36,37]. This implies that the perception of a landmark depends as 
much on one's conception of the world as it does on one's perception of it. Its computation 
should therefore be parallel to and quite independent of the process of computing the raw 
map. 
That perceiving landmarks requires an individual to attend to the details of what is 
perceived makes the object recognition process a natural starting point for landmark 
perception. We conclude with an attempt to formalise the definition of "landmarking", i.e., 
the process of creating a landmark (or marking a piece of" land") in the raw map. If a piece 
of information passes from the object recognition process to the raw map, it becomes a
landmark (see Fig. 22). Object recognition in this sense would include much more than 3D 
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Fig. 22. Landmarking--a process of transferring information from the object recognition process to the cognitive 
mapping process. 
object recognition (specifically object identification). It implies some high level reasoning 
of what is perceived based on one's experience. Note that the "mark" created need not 
be about the ASR itself. In fact, it is more likely for enhancing one of the objects inside 
or outside an ASR. If outside, the object will be connected to several surrounding ASRs. 
Whether it is possible to have a network of landmarks depends on whether one could 
establish a directional link between them. 
4.2. On related theories of cognitive mapping 
Our approach emphasises describing each local environment as a space of its own, void 
of anything, but which could then act as a container for describing the things in it and 
to provide a locus of activity. Some recent models of cognitive maps include the idea of 
computing a description of each local space/environment visited. For example, in Chown 
et al.'s [6] PLAN model of cognitive mapping, it is suggested that a network of local maps 
are computed in addition to a network of landmarks. In Poucet's [35] recent review of 
cognitive mapping in animals, he suggested that local views are integrated to form "places" 
which are representations of local environments independent of any specific local view. 
Both ideas are similar to our notion of an ASR. However, Poucet offered little detail on 
computational issues whereas an attempt to implement part of the PLAN model is found 
in RPLAN [24]. We therefore discuss further PLAN and RPLAN below. 
In RPLAN, the robot takes snapshots of its environment a the gateways which mark the 
transitions between adjacent spaces. Gateways are entrances to rooms and intersections 
of hallways. From these snapshots, called scenes in RPLAN, visual cues (landmarks) are 
extracted and connected to the cells in a locational grid which cover its location in the scene 
(see Fig. 23). The full 360 degrees i  divided into eight viewing directions and a locational 
grid constructed for each. Combined these form the directional grid which although it 
captures the full 360 degrees of the environment has an explicit forward direction which is 
the opposite direction to the previous gateway. Thus each direction in the directional grid 
is connected to a locational grid and each occupied cell in the locational grid is connected 
to a visual cue which occupies the same location in the scene. Combined the location and 
directional grids form the local map (see Fig. 24). 
It is interesting to note that in PLAN, it was suggested that each local map represents 
one's "directional space". That is, it tells us the direction of interesting neighbouring 
objects/landmarks. Forexample, and in Chown et al.'s [6] words, "when one is standing at 
the location corresponding to the local map, and when one desires to be facing a particular 
landmark, one should be able to use the local map to generate the relative change in 
orientation" [6, p. 22]. Chown et al. further argued that a local map is not computed 
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Fig. 23. The scene as a picture plane. Each cell marks a location in the scene, thus an occupied cell points to 
an object at that location in the scene. (Redrawn from Fig. 2 in [6]. Copyright © 1995, The Cognitive Science 
Society, Inc., used by permission.) 
visual cue 2 visual cue 3 visual cue 4 
visual cue 1 visual cue 5 
Fig. 24. RPLAN's local map structure, the directional grid (circle) comprising alocational grid (square) for each 
viewing direction. (Redrawn with permission from Fig. 3.8 in [24].) 
at the landmark but at points in the journey where people pause and look around. This 
idea is interesting and is closely related to our emphasis of  the importance of  exits in 
this paper and elsewhere [43]. However,  in RPLAN,  a local map is computed at each and 
every exit and is used to recognise where one is rather than as a directional space. I f  that 
is the case, their idea of  a local map is more like our notion of  an ASR.  Furthermore, 
that landmarks are computed at each local space again contradicts their theory of  cognit ive 
mapping as outlined in PLAN.  In PLAN,  the network of  local maps is computed initially to 
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complement the network of landmarks. The former provides direction information which 
is lacking in the latter but it was also suggested that the former eplaces the latter as one 
becomes more familiar with the environment [6, p. 29]. This idea is different from ours 
and especially in the light of our discussion in Section 4.1. 
4.3. Summary 
We now summarise our view of the cognitive mapping process and address ome of the 
immediate questions that have not so far been answered: 
- The cognitive mapping process is one of the two processes which takes as input the 
2 1/2D Sketch. The other is the object recognition process which includes higher- 
level reasoning of what is perceived. Both processes run in parallel. 
- As each local environment is entered, our eyes scan its parts. Exits will be identified 
and the boundary of an ASR constructed. At the same time, the object recognition 
process analyses the objects in view and evaluates their significance. If the objects 
are significant, heir presence in the raw map will be emphasised, effectively labelling 
them as landmarks. The ASRs containing them or their surrounding ASRs will be 
well remembered. We have not investigated this process and in particular the related 
problem of computing ASRs which contain objects. 
- As a new ASR is computed, the MFIS is re-organised with its origin centered on the 
new ASR. This constantly provides a global picture of one's immediate surroundings 
and helps recognition of nearby ASRs if re-visited immediately. When one leaves an 
ASR, it is entered into the raw map but its shape will be inexact and its connection 
with other ASRs fuzzy. 
- We need to investigate further the role of the MFIS in the construction of the ASRs. 
For example, if the ASR stays as part of the MFIS, is it necessary to remember it in 
the raw map? An advantage of using an MFIS is that when ASRs in the MFIS are 
revisited, one does not need to retrieve their description from the raw map for any 
updating. Perhaps one need only remember an ASR in the raw map when the ASR 
is to be removed from the MFIS. Since it is equally difficult to maintain an accurate 
global map of one's immediate surroundings, the information in the MFIS is already 
distorted. If ASRs are transferred from the MFIS to the raw map rather than when 
created, this may further explain why their shape and connection to other ASRs are 
fuzzy. It is also possible that for various reasons ome ASRs simply disappear f om 
the MFIS without being entered into the raw map. This could further explain the 
inability to have total recall of one's experience. 
- We have shown how the use of fuzzy ASRs can reproduce some of the problems 
experienced by humans when learning a novel environment. We need to investigate 
how such a raw map could eventually be useful for finding one's way in one's 
environment. In particular we need to explore the consequences of recognising ASRs. 
For example, when multiple ASRs for the same physical space are established as such, 
should they be merged and if so, how? 
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